Introduction
Visual perception is the process of inferring world structure from image structure. If the world structure we r e c o ver from our images \makes sense" as a plausible world event, then we h a ve a \percept" and can often o er a concise linguistic description of what we s e e . F or example, in the upper panel of Figure 3 .1, if asked, \What do you see?", a typical response might be a pillbox with a handle either erect (left) or at (right). This concise and con dent response suggests that we h a ve identi ed a model type that ts the image observation with no residual ambiguities at the level of the description. In contrast, when asked to describe the two l o wer drawings in Figure 3 .1, there is some hesitancy and uncertainty. Is the handle erect or not? Does it have a s k ewed or rectangular shape? The depiction leaves us somewhat uncertain, as if several options were possible, but none where all aspects of the interpretation collectively support each other. What then, leads us to the certainty in the upper set and to the ambiguity in the lower pair?
To be a bit more precise about our goal, let us assume that some Waltz-like algorithm has already identi ed the base of the pillbox and the wire-frame handle as separate 3D parts. Even with this decomposition, there remains an in nity of possible interpretations for any of these drawings. Yet we con dently commit to one interpretation in the case of the upper panel, but otherwise for the lower pair. Our aim, then, is to understand why the image structures in the upper panel support the assertion that they must arise only from very particular world structures, whereas the lower two structures seem more ambiguous.
Our analysis will consist of three parts: rst we will lay out the domain associated with pillboxes having handles. Then the role of preferences for 81 Fig. 3 .1 Some pillboxes with handles. In the upper left depiction, most immediately see the handle as rectangular and erect, whereas in the upper right the handle now appears at. In the two l o wer panels, both the shape and inclination of the handle are less clear, the percepts exhibiting some multistabilities. Most favor an inclined rectangular handle for the lower left the lower right d r a wing, however, yields mixed reports. certain structures will be introduced. The result will be a formal de nition for a percept. Finally, because our preferences are associated with structural regularities that have high priors in the assumed context, we recast the perceptual decision process in a Bayesian framework.
Representations and regularities
Our basic idea is that the structure and parameterizations of our models that describe the world should match the regularities of the image structure as closely as possible. Levesque (1986) and McAllister (1991) call such representations \vivid" because they allow certain kinds of deductions to be made e ortlessly (see also Davis, 1991, and Johnson-Laird, 1983) .y The \vivid" representations we seek are built from image properties that directly point onto the image plane with its bisector B oriented parallel to the projection of the surface normal, N (orthographic projection is assumed). However, if the handle is inclined to the surface or lies at, then the orientation between the bisector and normal can vary over a wide range, depending on (see Figure 3. 3).
to very speci c world properties we know and care about. These criteria place very strong constraints upon the kinds of image structures we should note. In particular, we will see that only certain classes of object properties can lead to \vivid" image structures that support robust deductions about the state of the world.
To clarify this point with respect to the examples chosen here, consider the orthographic projections of two rectangular handles onto the image plane as illustrated in Figure 3 .2. The normal to a surface N and the visual ray t o a point on the surface de ne a plane perpendicular to the surface at that point. This plane also de nes a line in the image. Then the surface normal and any other vector in this plane must project into this image line. The bisector B of a rectangular handle perpendicular to the surface is one such v ector. We will de ne such a handle as an erect, rectangular handle. However, if the same rectangular handle is not erect, i.e. is inclined at some angle to this perpendicular plane, then the angle of its projection is less constrained. In for arbitrary angles, other than the erect (0) and at ( =2) regularities which h a ve spikes in the probability density function. In the image (right), the erect handle also has a spike in the density function for orientation, because parallel vectors in the world are parallel in the image, hence the image angle of B 0 to N 0 is 0. All other handle inclinations project onto image angles that depend upon the viewpoint, or \slant" of the surface ( ). particular, the bisector of a at handle lying in the plane of the surface can project into any angle in the image (see Figure 3. 3). In a random world, where both angles and orientations are cast out with equal probability, t h e image distribution has a broad spectrum (Witkin, 1981) . Clearly, i f w e h a d to apply these data to infer the handle shape (i.e. its \skew") and its attachment angle, at best we could only make a maximum likelihood judgement that would typically be wrong.y In order for the perceiver to develop the inferential leverage needed to strongly disambiguate among many possible con gurations of equal likelihood, the world must behave somewhat more regularly (Lowe, 1985 Thompson, 1952 Witkin & Tenenbaum, 1983 . In particular, some structures should tend to occur signi cantly more often than predicted by a uniform distribution over all possible structures.
Consider then a world in which the perceiver knows that handles will often be rectangular and will lie either at, as if freely hinged and resting stably under gravity, or erect, as if rmly attached perpendicular to the surface. In this world, the distribution of handle orientations , rather than being y Surprisingly, given no other information, the maximum likelihood estimate for the 3D angle is just the image angle itself! uniform, will have t wo \spikes" or \modes", one at each of the two special world con gurations as shown in in the left panel of Figure 3 .3. In contrast, depending upon the slant of the surface, the expected image distribution of the handle bisector will be as in the right panel of Figure 3 .3. Now only the \erect" bisector continues to stand out distinctively. In this context, such an image feature is designated a \key" feature because (i) its likelihood of correctly indicating the presence of a particular world property i s h i g h (i.e. there are few false targets), and (ii) the associated world con guration has a signi cant prior probability (see Knill & Kersten, 1991 . This latter condition, though often overlooke d , i s c r i t i c a l to establishing that a given high-likelihood world interpretation is actually likely to be correct (see previous chapter by Jepson et al.) . In other words, the con guration ascribed to the world by an inference must actually be one that commonly occurs in the context. Otherwise, the probability o f t h e inference being correct will actually be dominated by the probability o f a false target.
The key feature condition entails, in e ect, that the perceiver's inferences will be categorically correct just in the case that (a) it is living in a world that tends to behave regularly { i.e. a world that includes certain special con gurations { and that furthermore (b) the perceiver knows what these special con gurations are and can correctly identify them. Such a c o m p etence is mandatory for any reasonable perceiver. It is important t o k eep in mind that there is an underlying hypothesis about these special con gurations that drives the perceiver's interest in them: loosely speaking, they are \meaningful" in that such con gurations play an important r o l e i n t h e causal forces at work in the perceiver's environment ( F eldman, 1992 ( F eldman, Leyton, 1992 . The perceiver, who presumably has an interest in discovering the rules underlying this causal behav i o r , i s t h us well-served to pay special attention to those con gurations that express these laws unambiguously. Hence the conclusion states of it's perceptual inference scheme should constitute robust pointers to the underlying laws that actually gave r i s e t o t h e observed con gurations.
To illustrate and to reinforce this point, consider again the upper left panel of Figure 3 .1. Our perception is of an erect rectangular handle, which i s a con guration associated with a probability spike as in Figure 3 .3. However, such a percept is also associated with a particular placement o ver a center of mass, having a stable construction due to orthogonal bracing (consistent with the method of construction governing many h uman artifacts that have load-bearing protuberances by which their designers intended them to be lifted: attache cases, trowels, and so forth). Similarly, the at con gura-tion seen in the upper right panel is associated with a gravitationally stable position of a hinged handle. Notice that the causal explanation behind each of these stable con gurations is not necessarily known to the perceiver. Rather, the point is that the perceiver has reason to believe that some such explanation is likely to exist (MacKay, 1978) . Conversely, if a causal force (like g r a vity) is known, then the perceiver is justi ed in placing a high prior on a con guration that this causal force will tend to produce (like the at handle). One has the sense that our most compelling percepts occur when several such modal observations or regularities are observed and immediately mesh together, creating a distinguished \mode". Then all the image structures we observe s i m ultaneously satisfy all the various con gurations of which w e h a ve knowledge and to which w e h a ve assigned high priors in the context. Thus, in the upper left panel of Figure 3 .1, we consider the handle pose entailed by requiring it to be rectangular, and the handle pose required for it to be perpendicular to the surface and symmetrically positioned, and then nd that all are the same pose! Clearly such an e ortless recognition of the coincidence of multiple regularities demands a representation based on the regularities themselves. We w ould claim that such a representation is both \vivid" and meaningful.
Structure lattice
To set up our representation, we begin by i n troducing a vehicle called a \structure lattice" that takes our context-sensitive, primitive concepts about structural regularities, and composes them to produce a set of possible conguration states. This is the rst of several such lattices we will introduce, the one upon which the later lattices will be built. Each of these lattices displays a partial ordering of the categorical states. (See Moray, 1990 , for a related proposal.) In the case of the structure lattice, the ordering is derived by noting that some states are special or limiting cases of others. Later we will impose context-speci c preferences upon this collection in order to seek a maximally preferred state.
To illustrate in more detail the role of regularities in creating a representation in which the perceptual categories become obvious, let us propose a context within which alignment and perpendicularity be special regularities between lines (or vectors) that we encounter in our non-random world. For example, assume that object parts have coordinate frames that are often aligned in some manner (Arnold & Binford, 1980) . For the pillbox and handle, we h a ve t wo \parts" and hence two coordinate frames. Let us specify the coordinate frame for the pillbox b y its symmetry axis A, and by the feet Figure 3 .4.) We will assume that the pillbox has been cut at right angles to A, and hence the surface normal N to the top of the pill box will align with the axis A. (Note this assumed axiomatic regularity!) Together, A and H (or henceforth N and H) set up a right-angled Cartesian coordinate frame at the center of the top of the pillbox. Let K be a unit vector orthogonal to N and H, de ned by K = N H. Unfortunately, without knowledge of the actual slant of the surface of the pillbox top, the depiction of K in Figure 3 .4 is incompletely speci ed. Hence we assume h e r e a w orld consistent with the maximum likelihood rule for slant derived by Kanade (1983) , which w as observed psychophysically by S t e v ens (1983) for right-angled coordinate frames. In this case the image projection of K will lie on the bisector of the image angle between N and H, as depicted in Figure 3 .4. This additional \maximum likelihood" assumption allows us to relate the world-based Cartesian coordinate frame of N, H and K to its 
Pillbox is seen from above.
The additional vector G is taken to be the gravity axis, which is aligned with the customary page orientation, typical for the depiction of a stably supported object.y In sum, the above equalities set up two coordinate frames, one rectangular for the pillbox de ned by N and H and the other not necessarily rectangular for the handle de ned by B and H. Given the vectors N, B, H and K we c a n n o w explore all possible alignments of these vectors. Recall we are proposing that the perceiver is aware of certain \modes" or con gurations of structures that occur often in the world. In particular the special regularities we c hose were the collinearity o f two lines or vectors, such a s B = N, and the perpendicularity o f t wo lines, such a s B ? H, which corresponds to a rectangular handle, or B ? N which de nes a at handle. Hence to generate all these special con gurations that are the consequence of these particular relational concepts, we simply enumerate all the alignments of B with N, K and H, using either the collinear y Elsewhere we h a ve explored this preference for supported objects If the bisector B does not align with either N, K or H, t h e n w e de ne the handle as being either \tilted", which is noted as \T", or \skewed", which i s noted as \S", or both, namely \TS ". In particular, if the bisector is in the plane determined by N and K, then the handle is tilted and rectangular, i.e. \TR ". Similarly, if the bisector is in the plane containing N and H, it will be erect and skewed, i.e. \ES", while for the at and skewed state the bisector will be in the H-K plane. Thus, excluding the above collinear specializations, we n o w h a ve the following additional three new cases (alternatively we could have lled out a 4 4 Excluding the degenerate case B = H, w e t h us have six types of categories for the positioning of the handle, given our conceptualization that part-based structures in the world typically are related by an alignment of some aspect of their individual coordinate frames. Because we can count the number of axes of each frame that are aligned (i.e. either one axis or two), a partial ordering can be placed on these six types of structures. This is illustrated in At the top of this lattice, the positioning, T , and shape, S, of the handle is arbitrary. A t the bottom, however, we have t wo states where the position and shape of the handle are both xed to be rectangular and either at or erect (i.e. F Rand ER). In other words, all degrees of freedom of alignments have been removed. In between are the planar alignment states where one degree of freedom of movement is still allowed. For example, the leftmost node ESpermits the skew of the handle to vary, but it must remain erect. Hence, as we m o ve from top to bottom in this lattice, more and more specialization or restrictions are placed on the con guration. We call this lattice a \structure lattice" because, given this context with the assumed alignment regularity this lattice shows the specialization relations between the categories of structures in the world that will appear in our representation. Elsewhere explores conditions that allow such lattices to be built automatically.
Preference relations
The structure lattice simply enumerates the structural categories that we know about, or can easily infer, given our chosen regularities. Ideally, w e would hope that the image is consistent with some kind of maximization of these regularities. In other words, given a particular context, we expect
Fig. 3.6 Elemental preference relations for handle shape (left) and handle inclination (right).
certain regularities to appear, but in another context the structures expected might di er. For example, a \ at" handle would not be likely if the pillbox were upside down. This suggests that given a context, there is a preference ordering on the expected regularities. If you will, a ranking is given to the prior probabilities of the structures that are expected in the assumed context. (Later, in Section 3.6.1, we will recast some of these notions in a Bayesian framework.) A preference ordering di ers from the structure ordering introduced in the previous section. The structure lattice simply presents all the categories available to us in the chosen context, ordered with respect to increasing specialization of structure. A preference ordering speci es which kinds of specializations are preferred to others. So, for example, given a choice between handle shapes that are rectangular or skewed, we'll prefer the rectangular version. This preference should not be surprising, because if our representation is to be \vivid", then the chosen parameterization (e.g. rectilinear coordinates) and the preferences (e.g. rectangular) should be tightly coupled. Denote this preference for rectangular over skewed shapes as R > S . Similarly, for the attachment angles, our parameterization suggests that the erect \E" and at \F" angles will be preferred over arbitrary inclinations, or \tilts", \T", hence E > T and F > T . H o wever, we h a ve no reason to believe that an arbitrarily shaped erect handle \E" will be preferred over one that is at, \F". Denote this indi erence by E F . W e will designate these three orderings, one for shape and the other two for attachment angle as the \elemental" preference orderings. They can also be cast in the form of a directed graph as in Figure 3 .6.
Using the above elemental preference relations, we c a n n o w impose a par- tial order on the states of the base plus handle con gurations that we k n o w about, namely the states shown in Figure 3 .5. This preference ordering is based on the consensus of the elemental preference relations, and is illustrated in Figure 3 .7. Note that a state such a s ERis to be preferred over T Sbecause both of the elemental preference relations, E > T and R > S , favor the same state. However, such a consensus does not always occur. For example, the same two elemental relations are in con ict for the states ES and T R , and as a result these two states remain unordered in the preference ordering. The intuition behind such unordered states is that the perceiver does not have su cient information to be able to resolve whether ESshould be preferred to T R , o r v i c e v ersa. Thus unordered states represent a total lack of information on the appropriate preference. In addition, we also have a distinct notion of an equal preference between two states, such as occurs between ERand F R , a s w ell as between ESand F S .
In general we cannot expect a consensus ordering to provide a total ordering of the state space, because some con icts amoungst the elemental preference relations are likely to hold. This is related to Arrow's general impossibility theorem which states that rational choice -i.e. rational voting behaviour -does not guarantee a unique winner (Doyle & Wellman, 1989 Saari, 1994 . Somewhat counter-intuitively, the introduction of more elemental preference relations does not lead to a more complete ordering, but rather tends to introduce more con icts and hence tends to eliminate ordering relations. To counteract this tendency to fracture the state-space, it is often useful to consider priorities amongst the elemental preference relations . Such priorities can break particular con icts and thereby enlarge the ordering. Nevertheless, we should expect typical preference orderings to be partial as a consequence of the incomplete knowledge a perceiver has of its current domain. Of particular interest are instances in which the ordering results in several maximally preferred explanations of the image structure, where it remains undecided just which maximal state is to be preferred. As we discuss below, this is an intuitive explanation behind the di erence in the stability of the percepts in the upper and lower panels of 
The pillbox plus handle
To clarify our framework further, we n o w return to Figure 3 .1, and use these images together with the preference relations to impose an ordering on the state space in each case. Not surprisingly, our notion is that the state which is maximally preferred in this ordering will contain our percept.
To set up these examples, we assume that the view is from above and that the world-based Cartesian coordinate frame for the pillbox is consistent with the Kanade-Stevens rule, as depicted in Figure 3 .4 (i.e. that the axis K is seen as lying along the bisector of the image angle between N and H). We take this coordinate frame as being the unique coordinate system containing the line H and the line perpendicular to N. Later we will consider cases when this frame itself appears as a preference that may be altered.
A \vivid" representation
We begin by c hoosing a representation that allows us to e ortlessly read o the states of the handle of interest, given a particular image. Figure 3.4 shows the form of this vivid representation, based on the N, K and H coordinates. The added feature is that now w e identify the six sectors of unit circle (seen slanted) that lie between the projections of these axes of the coordinate frame. The idea then is to regard the bisector B as the arm of a clock, and simply note either the sector it falls in, or whether it is precisely 
Case by case analysis
The state space for the two upper drawings in the top panel of Figure 3 .1 is given in Table 3 .2. Again, we use the notation E, F , R respectively to indicate an erect, at or rectangular handle, or S and T respectively to indicate either a skewed or \tilted" handle. Figure 3 .4. These three inconsistent states are indicated by a n asterisk in Table 3 .2. The remaining three valid states, T S , F S , and ERcan now be ordered using consensus amongst the elemental preference relations introduced above. The result is shown in Figure 3 .8 left, and is seen to be a total ordering with the erect rectangular handle (ER) as the unique maximal state. Similarly, for the upper right drawing we rst note that the leg of the handle, hence the bisector B appears to align with the axis K in the KanadeStevens coordinate frame for the pillbox. Therefore, F Ris obviously in the state space. However, the true 3D orientation of B need not be coincident with K, but can point a n ywhere in the plane created by the lines of sight through K, and hence T Sis also a possibility. O b viously the erect states ESand ERare excluded because B lies in sectors 3 and 4 below H. States T Rand F Sare marginal, depending on whether B is taken to be precisely aligned with K or not. If B is seen to fall below K in the representation depicted in Figure 3 .4 (i.e. in sector 4), then T Ris not in the state space. But if B lies above K (in sector 3), then T Ris a possibility. In either case, F Sis possible. Because of this ambiguity T Rand F Sare shown parenthetically in Table 3 .1, and as dotted nodes in the preference ordering of Figure 3 .8 (right). Again, the ordering here follows from the relations F > T and R > S , yielding the state F Rseen most \vividly" as the maximal node.
For the two m o r e a m biguous drawings in the lower panel of Figure 3 .1 we m a y go through a similar exercise. The allowable states are given in Table 3 .3. To review the allowable states, rst note that the revision introduced by s k ewing the handle shape misaligns B and N, a s w ell as B and K, i.e. the Kanade-Stevens coordinate frame (Figure 3 .4) and hence for both of the lower gures the handle can not be either at and rectangular or erect and rectangular (as indicated by t h e i n t h e l a s t t wo r o ws of Table 3 Table 3 .2 using the same elemental preference relations as before. In one case, there are three maximal nodes, namely ES, F Sand T R , whereas in the other, there are only two, ES and F S . In both cases, states ES and F Sare equally preferred, with the perceiver having no information supporting one over the other. For the bottom left panel of Figure 3 .1 however, the additional maximal state T R is unordered with respect to the other two. That is, the perceiver cannot determine if T Ris to be more, less, or equally preferred when compared to ES and F S . Hence unlike the top panel of Figure 3 .1, our perceiver is left with several possible interpretations, given this choice of representation. In the natural world, this is clearly not desirable, and additional evidence might w ell be sought to distinguish between these choices. Alternately, t h e context may be revised.
Context revision
A possible weak link in the above treatment is the imposition of the KanadeStevens coordinate frame which speci ed the image direction of axis K by using a bisector rule (Figure 3 .4). Although this setup creates one particular \vivid" representation where most categorical states can be readily recognized, the choice is clearly a \rule of thumb", and hence a premise or preference. Other choices, equally vivid, are possible. For example why not pick for the unspeci ed axis K the minor axis of the imaged pillbox t o p ? Or perhaps even align K with a leg of the handle? Although this latter choice may seem a bit bizarre for the current orientation of Figure 3 .1, the choice becomes more plausible for the lower panel if the page is rotated so the handle's feet are near vertical. Still another option is simply to leave the viewpoint uncertain, which i s e q u i v alent to letting the image of axis K lie anywhere in the sector between the normals to the images of N and H (see Figure 3 .10, bottom left).y To s h o w the e ect of including other assumptions about the coordinate y If this condition was violated then the three coordinate axes K, N and H would lie in a sector having an angle smaller than 90 degrees, which is not consistent with the axes arising from a right-angled system. Priors, Preferences and Categorical Percepts 97 frame, consider this last \don't know" option for the orientation of axis K. Let the initial Kanade-Stevens viewpoint premise for the axis K be designated as K and let K denote the relaxed preference that the K axis need only lie in the range appropriate for a right-angled system. We t a k e as the elemental preference ordering K > K for the customary viewing of Figure 3 .1. Clearly in this revised context K all the states computed previously still reappear. Hence if the original state space included states ERand T R , n o w designated as ERKand T R K , then the augmented state space will include states ERK and T R K as well. Of course, our preference ordering K > K will still place these original states such a s ERKabove their counterparts, i.e. ERK, in the ordering. However, as we shall see shortly, e n tirely new states may also appear.
To create a vivid depiction of the additional states possible under the relaxed K premise, we again use the image sector scheme illustrated in Figure 3 .4. The only change is that now three di erent cases must be considered for each of the panels of pose for the handle is allowed, namely F R K, along with the skewed states T S K and ESK. T h us the state space can again be constructed using the simple rules about the sectors, even though the viewpoint premise K does not pick out a unique coordinate system. Taken together then, for the bottom left panel in Figure 3 .1 we see that the relaxation of the coordinate axis premise to K produces the states T R K, F R K, a n d SK. These states can be included in the ordering provided in Figure 3 .9, with the previous states appended by K to make the viewpoint premise explicit. Considering the elemental preference relation K > K, w e nd that the previous local maxima all remain local maxima in the revised context. Moreover, a new local maximum F R K is also introduced.
The analysis of revised context for the other panels in Figure 3 .1 can be done in a similar way. F or the bottom right panel, the situation is much the same as above with a new local maximum, F R K, appearing and with the states ESKand F S Kremaining as local maxima. Interestingly, f o r t h e top left panel (B = N) no new handle con gurations appear with the K premise and the unique maximal state remains ERK. Finally, for the top right panel of Figure 3 .1 (B = K), two new handle con gurations appear in the states space, namely F S K and T R K. H o wever, the revised context still has a unique maximal node, F R K , corresponding to the at rectangular handle. Hence the particular context revision of including the relaxed premise K, which requires simply that the three axes N, H and K are orthogonal, has not resolved the issue of multiple local maxima in the preference orderings for the lower panels. In some sense it has made the ambiguity w orse by introducing new possibilities. As previously mentioned, this is not entirely unexpected, because in general the addition of premises cannot reduce the number of local maxima (see . In some scenes, however, especially natural ones that are rich in regularities, a context revision can lead to the observance of new features indicative of additional regularities and a new maximal node will emerge that contains co-occurrences of these regularities. The percept associated with such a node will be \more coherent" and hence less ambiguous. An example of this is treated elsewhere .
Recapitulation
To summarize, our notion then is that each image is evaluated with respect to the current set of observed regularities. These regularities suggest a c o n text that dictates the form of the model representation. Given this representation and the image, a set of categorical structures can be deduced easily as \vivid" states (i.e. the state space). The context also points to preferences for certain 3D regularities in the representation, which are used to place an ordering on the feasible states or \interpretations". Hopefully there will be a unique global maximum in this ordering that \explains" all the observed regularities, given the image and the preferences (such a s i n Figure 3 .8). If not, or if further regularities are observed in the resultant 3D interpretation, or if additional relevant premises are retrieved from the knowledge base, the context may be revised and the process continued with the aim of insuring that all regularities, both in the image and in the interpretation, are explained by the preferences at hand. Sometimes, as in the lower panel of Figure 3 .1, closure is not possible, and several maximal interpretations continue to be evaluated (Figure 3.9) . In all cases, the explanation of the image attempts to maximize our preferences for certain world regularities over other states. This leads to the following proposal for de ning a \percept":
Proposal: Given a context, a percept is an interpretation in the state space that is locally maximal within the associated preference ordering.
Elsewhere , we h a ve elaborated the consequences of this proposal, and its implications for the machinery that underlies the perceptual process itself. However, of special interest for this collection of papers is the relation between the above Boolean proposal for percepts and one based on versions of utility or probability theory (such as DempsterShafer or Pearl's (1988) Bayesian graphs). In the following section, we provide a partial bridge to these alternative approaches.
Bayesian formulation
Our framework for understanding percepts is based on recognizing that certain image structures point reliably to particular regularities of properties in the world with which w e are familiar and expect in certain contexts. In other words, these regularities have high priors in that context. Here, these are the world properties \rectangular angle", R a \ at" handle F an \erect" handle E and the Kanade-Stevens coordinate frame, K. W e regard these properties as special, in that their probability d e n s i t y functions are \modal", whereas in contrast, the properties \tilted" T and \skewed" S have broad density functions (see Figure 3 .10). The perceiver is assumed to have a n internal model for these properties, together with some tolerance for accepting the actual 3D angular values, namely for the tilt angle, for skew and the K axis. A Bayesian perceiver also has a probabilistic model for the generation of images. (For example, a random selection of a tilt, skew and viewpoint from the distributions sketched in Figure 3 .10 would be one possibility.) Together, the particular values of tilt and skew chosen comprise a scene model, which then is compiled with the \viewpoint" to generate a sample image, as indicated by the directed graph of Figure 3 .11. Note that the graph assumes that these three properties are independent, thereby a llowing us certain simpli cations in the calculation of various probabilities. Given the assumption that images are generated according to the probabilistic model outlined in Figures 3.10 and 3.11 (call this`context C'), and given a particular image I, t h e n a B a yesian may attempt to nd the interpretation(s) which maximize the a posteriori probability d e n s i t y, p( jI C), as a function of the generative parameters , , a n d . Our idealization in terms of delta functions presents a minor technical di culty here, in that the precise value of the height of a delta function is unspeci ed. So instead we consider the probability that the generative parameters lie within the resolution tolerance of a speci ed point, namely as p( jI C) . As we s k etch below, these probabilities can be computed using Bayes' rule.
To simplify the presentation, and to mirror the previous development i n terms of preference orderings, we consider the special case in which = 0 , that is, the viewpoint is such that the Kanade-Stevens coordinates apply. Bayes' Rule provides the a posteriori probability density of the tilt and skew, given the image I, the context C, and the viewpoint coordinate frame choice V (which in this case will be K): However, referring again to the Bayesian net of Figure 3 .11, the assumption of the independence of the chosen viewpoint frame and the tilt and skew of the handle allows us to factor out V from the priors. Hence the priors can be decomposed as follows:
Substituting (2) into (1) we nd that:
where the rst term on the right hand side is the likelihood of the image given the scene and viewpoint, while the next term in brackets is the prior probability densities. Note that the denominator p(IjV C), will be a constant scaling factor as long as we consider a particular image I, viewpoint V and context C. Because our concern here is to simply compare various a posteriori probabilities we can safely ignore this constant term.
Modal Analysis
To e v aluate the possible interpretations of any of the panels of Figure 3 .1, we wish to maximize the a posteriori probability, g i v en our resolution limits, namely and . Since we are assuming K, the viewpoint is pinned down and the space of possibilities is simply represented by the remaining unknowns and , as depicted in Figure 3 .12. This gure provides schematics for the prior probability distribution and the likelihood functions, for the upper and lower left panels in Figure 3 .1. That is, all the information needed by a B a yesian perceiver is represented. The locations of the special world regularities are shown by the solid bars labelled R(rectangular), E(erect) a n d F (fl a t ), which g i v e the graph the appearance of a window. In other words, we h a ve simply taken the modal priors R, E, F graphed in Figure 3 .10, and allowed these \spike" modes to span the full tilt-skew space, using the weighting function \T" in Figure 3 .10 for the R mode, and the function \S" for the E and F modes. Each modal prior in Figure 3 .12 thus has a smooth distribution over the window, concentrated on either the center cross bar (R) or the three uprights (E, F ). In addition, at the three intersections of these bars there are point or \spike" delta functions for the ERor F Rcombinations. Thus each of the six di erent structures for the orientation of the handle occur with nonzero probability. (Note that this depiction makes the structure relations represented by Figure 3 .5 quite explicit, with the di erent levels in Figure 3 .5 appearing as sets of di erent dimensions.) In addition to the priors, we h a ve also depicted the likelihood function p(Ij V C). F or the noise-free case, this function simply picks out a one-parameter family of possible tilts ( ) and skews ( ) that are consistent with I, V and C. The family is represented by the lines labelled f( ) in Figure 3 .12 for the two cases considered. Finally, the e ect of noise in the image measurements is crudely represented by the bands overlaid on these lines. This band represents the extent of support for the \blurred" likelihood function formed by sampling several images I 0 for nearly the same scene geometry. F or simplicity w e assume this blurred likelihood function is roughly constant within the shaded band and vanishes elsewhere (nothing substantial depends on this assumption). In fact, since we only need to compare probabilities we w i l l ignore this constant.
We n o w wish to evaluate the a posteriori probabilities for various states. This will simply be the respective probability masses obtained by i n tegrating the product of the prior and likelihood functions over a small patch o f s i z e by . Since we are assuming simple uniform behavior for the priors, these calculations are conveniently summarized by the category from which the point ( ) i s t a k en, that is, T R , T S , etc. Letting the prior for \ at" be designated as F , and similarly for E, T , S and R, w e calculate the probabilities as shown in Table 3 .4. For Table 3 .4a, which corresponds to the bottom left image in Figure 3 .1, note that zeros appear for the states ER, F R , which w ere found to be inconsistent ( s e e T able 3.2) and lie o the band in Figure 3 .12. However, consider choosing a point ( ) in the intersection of the diagonal band and the regularity R. The segment of length of the line-delta function along R contributes a probability m a s s o f T R , as listed in Table 3 .4a. In addition, there is another additive term of size , arising from the smooth distribution function. We h a ve neglected this second, higher order term in Table 3 .4a since, for high resolution, it will be dominated by the former modal case. The other entries in Table 3 .4 can be obtained in a similar way (the 1=2 term is included because there are two \ at" possibilities). Notice that for Table 3 .4b, the ERentry does not depend on either or . This is because the diagonal band now goes through the origin of the window, where there is a delta function in Table 3 .4 A p osteriori probabilities for the con guration speci ed b y t h e point ( , ), for the two left panels of Figure 3 .1, as a function of the various categories of tilt and skew for this point. the priors according to the erect and rectangular mode (again we o m i t t h e higher order terms in and ). Given these a posteriori probabilities, we c a n n o w consider choosing the maximum probability states. Assume that both and are much smaller than any of the the modal probabilities i . That is, assume that the resolution of the system is su ciently high. In this regime certain comparisons of probabilities are easy to resolve we need only count the number of 's. For example, from Table 3 .4b we see that the maximal state for the top left image in Figure 3 .1 must come from the category ER, because this is the only category for which the probability does not depend on the resolution (or vanish altogether). This agrees with our preference ordering in Figure 3 .8 left. Similarly, w e place state T Sat the bottom of the Bayesian order. But without more information about the priors, states ES, F Sand T Rcan only be given some intermediate ordering between T Sand ER. Note that this probability ordering parallels, but is not identical to, our previous analysis, which assumed noise-free alignments (and hence excluded states ES and T R ).
Similarly, f r o m T able 3.4a we obtain an ordering of the states for the bottom left image in Figure 3 .1. In particular, for su ciently ne resolution, and nonzero modal probabilities, any state within T Scannot be maximal but a state in either ES, F S , o r T Rmay be. These latter states are precisely the maximal states computed using the preference ordering (see Figure 3 .9 left). To recreate our previous ordering we w ould need the additional assumption that E and 1 2 F are to be considered roughly equivalent. Moreover, to eliminate the ES F Sindi erence and to make the ordering complete, we w ould need to be able to compare the probabilities E S and T R . Of course, if we h a d n umerical estimates for all these quantities then a total ordering may result, such a s T S! F S! ES! T R . Clearly when such priors and resolution limits are known precisely, the Bayesian approach will (almost) always yield a unique maximal a posteriori interpretation.
Context and coordinate frame
Our Bayesian treatment skirted the issue of the choice of coordinate frame for the pillbox b y assuming the Kanade-Stevens coordinate frame. However, as illustrated earlier, a preference ordering of possible states may be sensitive to the choice of assumptions about the coordinate frame. In particular, in addition to the Kanade-Stevens frame premise K, w e also examined the premise K, in which the choice needed only to be consistent with some view of a right-angled frame. Here we consider the Bayesian version of this less restrictive viewpoint c hoice.
To begin, it is of interest to consider a suitable quantitative prior. A natural default context is the view of a right-angled coordinate frame from a uniformly distributed random viewpoint (see Arnold & Binford, 1980 Freeman, 1994 ). We t a k e this to be the image independent prior, according to the directed graph of Figure 3 .11. However, in order to calculate the effective prior on angle (see Figure 3 .10), we need also to consider image information, namely the angle between the images of N and H. ( F or notational simplicity w e will ignore p( jC), etc., e ectively treating this image angle to be part of the context C.) To s i m ulate the distribution for we randomly generate views of a rightangled coordinate frame. Moreover, we discarded cases in which the angle between a pair of axes (in the image) failed to lie within a particular tolerance of a speci ed angle (eg. 60 degrees). This gives an approximation for the statistics of randomly viewing the N, H, a n d K coordinate frame, conditional on the image having a particular angle between N and H. A histogram was constructed of the deviation, , from the bisector rule. The histogram appears relatively at across the range =2, with no signi cant peak or mode at the Kanade-Stevens rule = 0 . T h us a suitable prior for appears to be a at distribution, not the modal one pictured in Figure 3 .10.
As in Section 3.5.3, where our default frame K lay arbitrarily within an appropriate range for a rectilinear frame, we can consider the implications of having a at prior for , but this time with respect to the Bayesian approach. The critical case turns out to be the bottom left image in Figure 3. 1. Recall that the state space for this image, given the unconstrained viewpoint premise K, consisted of the states F R , T R , and S. In terms of our schematic in Figure 3 .12, this means that the likelihood density for this image, given the K premisey, is a broad distribution that intersects all these states (but not ER). The important di erence between this distribution and the shaded band depicted in Figure 3 .12 (left) is that this extended band now includes the state F R , rather than just the F Sstate as depicted. Calculations similar to those for Table 3 .4 shows that the F Rstate has a probability proportional to 1 2 F R (as before, we are treating the magnitude of the blurred likelihood as roughly constant, and dropping it). The other terms in Table 3 .4a remain the same (after factoring out the lower blurred likelihood contribution). For a su ciently ne resolutions we see that this F Rstate dominates, and is the unique interpretation which maximizes the a posteriori probability.
Psychophysically the F Rstate is seldom reported for the bottom left image in Figure 3 .1. The most common interpretation is T R , which c o n tains a local maxima in both our preference ordering and our previous \modal" a posteriori probability distribution. How then can the seemingly more \cor-rect" a-modal or at prior for K be reconciled with the perceiver's choice for a modal K? One interesting possibility is that the modal prior for the Kanade-Stevens frame is actually`in the head', even though it does not occur in our random viewpoint c o n text. This is (weakly) supported by psychophysical experiments of which indicate the general existence modal priors in the head, and by Stevens (1983) data on the bisector rule. A possible source of such a prior might be from viewing line drawings, where the bisector rule could appear modally as a convention. Alternatively, it may arise as a consequence of a heuristic such as minimum slant (Kanade, 1983) . In either case, if our perceptual system is Bayesian, then the priors on the possible viewpoints of Figure 3 .1 appear to be biased in favour of the \modal" bisector rule, and moreover this bias is unfair relative to a uniform distribution of viewpoints.
Preference lattices vs. Bayesian optimizations
One might inquire about the relation between our framework, and other approaches to data interpretation that emphasize probability measures and weighted variables (see several chapters in this volume, as well as B ultho & Mallott, 1988 Clark & Yuille, 1990 . As previously mentioned, the primary distinction is that we a s s i g n v alues either near zero or one, attempting to choose image features and world regularities that support such extreme y I.e. p( jC) is a uniform distribution over the interval (; =2 = 2).
measures. Hence we are stressing categorical, as contrasted to metrical judgments about structures in the world. This should be clear from the discussion surrounding key features (Figure 3 .2) and our \binary" use of Bayesian probabilities. The advantage of our approach is that when priors are \modal" and are cast in the form of elemental preference relations which are relatively insensitive t o c o n text, we can obtain a relatively context-free partial ordering of the states. In other words, the essence of the priors is captured by the preference relations without the need to assume complex relationships based on probability density functions, utility factors, etc. (Arrow, 1963 ). Although we lose statistical optimality, w e gain a robustness over contexts. The use and form of the preferences, then, are more akin to Bennett & Ho man's Boolean Lebesque logic, than they are to statistical estimation procedures.
To make this advantage still clearer, note that maximal nodes in our preference orderings (i.e. the percepts) represent the transitive closure of the preference relations applied to the set of interpretations in the state space. In order to get a picture of this, imagine that each elementary preference relation is taken to have i t s o wn dimension. When the elementary preference relations are binary, the result is that the state space has been laid out at the vertices of a multi-dimensional cube. The edges of the cube correspond to the elementary preference relations and, overall, the preferences all favour moving towards one vertex of the multi-dimensional cube. Two states can be compared if and only if one of them is strictly closer to the optimal vertex. Otherwise the states will remain unordered. This occurs, for example, when one elementary preference relation favors one state and another relation favors the other state. Given this strong restriction on the derived ordering, it should be clear that weights on the preference relations will not change the ordering of the state space. Maximal nodes { i.e. the \percepts" { will continue to remain maximal.
A fully probabilistic approach, on the other hand, would assign a single number, the a posteriori probability, t o e a c h state, just as we attempted to do in Section 3.6. In such a s c heme, presumably many di erent factors and weights have been merged into a single number, and now the states indeed can be totally ordered by the magnitude of these numbers, if they are computable. The merging process allows trade-o s between various di erent e ects to be evaluated and resolved, but requires quantitative k n o wledge about a priori conditional distributions. If these quantities were known, and if the probabilities can be computed correctly, then clearly the fully probabilistic approach is optimal. (See 
Conclusion
We h a ve attempted to illustrate the tight coupling between image structure, world structure, and representation. If image features are not chosen to satisfy key feature requirements, then not all useful world structures will be reliably and \vividly" inferrable directly from image structure. However, even image structure alone is not a su cient basis for inferring world structure. The right-angled handle is one such example. Although common in our world, it does not by itself project into a reliable and robust image feature. Yet, the regularity still is an important ingredient in our perceptual reasoning process because it serves to bind together other observable properties in a \Natural Mode". Such modal properties, although not always solutions to key features, still lead to more robust models. The examples in Figure 3 .1 illustrate these points. For the upper left panel, the percept is clear and robust because the modal co-occurrence of rectangular and erect appears vividly in the chosen representation. For the other panels the co-occurrences are not explicable. For example in the upper right panel, a co-occurrence between the handle shape and pose results only if the third axis is chosen appropriately. In the lower pair, where there is no such co-occurrence, the percept is less clear. Hence the incorporation of modal regularities as an explicit part of the representation appears to us a crucial aspect of perception. Learning such modal correlations that support natural modes and which direct the recon guration of the perceiver's representations, are clearly important elements in the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Elsewhere in this volume Barlow and also Mumford address this issue.
Although our principal aim was to explore the relation between priors, preferences and percepts, a consequence of this is that considerable machinery and issues were introduced along the way. Our intent w as not to address these issues directly, because their treatment will depend to a large part upon the hardware and computational abilities of the perceiver. Instead we h a ve attempted to focus upon the competence of a perceiver, not its performance, although in this respect our inclusion of \vivid" representations was clearly a departure. Here we highlight four additional performance issues that clearly loom quite large. These are (i) the richness required of our conceptualization (ii) the exibility of the reasoning process (iii) the choice of the aspects or features of the image that are relevant and (iv) the indexing to the appropriate context that sets up the state space and preference relations. At the heart of our treatment is the notion that percepts are inductive inferences based on premises and preferences (Gregory, 1970 , 1980 Helmholtz, 1963 Rock, 1983 and that this inference process entails reasoning about consistency or plausibility in a conceptualization of the world (see Bennett, Ho man & Prakash, 1989 Nakayama & Shimojo 1992 . No matter what the logical or illogical form, the reasoning process must be world-based, not image-based. Hence a conceptualization must be indexed, a context chosen right a t t h e outset before the preferred interpretations can be sought.
A considerable amount o f w ork remains to develop and explore the proposed framework in a complete and formal manner. (See , for rst steps in this direction.) For example, in this paper we h a ve used the notion of interpretations that are consistent with an image. A formal speci cation of this notion is given in Reiter & Mackworth (1989) , and this component itself can be seen to involve considerable machinery. A second formal issue is that the transitive closure of the elementary preference relations must be a partial order. Ascent through this order and the search for locally maximal nodes raise several technical di culties that we h a ve ignored. A third important issue is to elaborate the means for recognizing and evaluating incoherent i n terpretations that leave regularities unexplained Ge ner, 1989 MacKay, 1978 . And nally, considerable experimental work needs to be done to determine appropriate sets of preferences and their correlated regularities: i.e. the modes and their associated elemental preference relations.
